An integrative framework of preemption strategies by Lee, Khai S. & Ng, Irene C. L.
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF PRE-EMPTION STRATEGIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Khai Sheang Lee, Ph.D. 
 
Irene C. L. Ng, Ph.D. 
 
Lee, Khai S. and Irene C L Ng, (2007), “An Integrative Framework of Pre-Emption Strategies,” Journal of 
Strategic Marketing, Forthcoming 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** Please direct all correspondences to the second author 
  
Khai-Sheang Lee is Associate Professor, Department of Marketing, Faculty of Business 
Administration, National University of Singapore, 15 Law Link, FBA1-03-10, Singapore 117591, 
Tel: (65) 874 3163, Email: bizleeks@nus.edu.sg. 
 
Irene C L Ng is Senior Lecturer in Marketing at the School of Business and Economics, University 
of Exeter, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4PU, United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0) 1392 
263250, Fax: +44 (0) 1392 263242, Email: irene.ng@exeter.ac.uk  
 
 
Lee, Khai S. and Irene C L Ng, (2007), “An Integrative Framework of Pre-Emption Strategies,” Journal of 
Strategic Marketing, Forthcoming 
 
1 
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF PRE-EMPTION STRATEGIES 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper performs a review of the various pre-emption strategies prescribed in the 
economics literature. These are cost superiority, consumers’ switching cost, channel exclusivity, 
environmental barriers of entry and credible commitment to react aggressively. Through our 
analysis, we develop an integrative framework of the pre-emption strategies that will result in 
long-term payoffs to the firm. 
The framework proposes that there are two key dimensions – strategic advantage and 
strategic focus -- and identify five generic types of pre-emption strategies for market incumbents.  
These are the switching cost, blockade, credible commitment, tie-up, and cost leadership 
strategies.  The pre-emption strategies and the framework presented can assist managerial 
decision-making for the successful pre-emption of potential competition to complement their 
existing efforts.  
 
Keywords:  Pre-emption, First Mover, Strategic Advantage, Strategic Focus, and Competitive 
Advantages. 
 
 
Lee, Khai S. and Irene C L Ng, (2007), “An Integrative Framework of Pre-Emption Strategies,” Journal of 
Strategic Marketing, Forthcoming 
 
1 
AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF PRE-EMPTION STRATEGIES 
 
 
Introduction 
Firms achieve a first mover status by being the first to introduce a new product, develop a 
new process, or enter a new market (Kerin, Varadarajan and Peterson, 1992; Johnson and 
Scholes, 2002), and first mover advantage often enables pioneering firms to earn sustainable 
economic profits (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Theoretically, first movers might enjoy the 
luxury of finding a market for their products and establishing a hold of the market, without having 
to deal with the complexities that come with the presence of competition. Furthermore, leadership 
in product and technology, pre-emption of assets, and development of buyer switching costs 
could be achieved by a first mover (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Those situations are 
often exploited by pioneering firms to obtain the highest possible returns.  Empirical research 
shows that successful market pioneers generally achieve higher market shares and better 
business performances than market followers (Lambkin, 1988; Miller et al., 1989; and Kalyanaran 
et al., 1995). 
Yet, it is also known that market pioneers do not always succeed in the long term 
(Schnaars, 1986).  One reason for this is because of competitive entries into the market.  Once 
the attractiveness of a market becomes apparent, competing firms are attracted to enter it.  Such 
entries may erode a pioneer’s hold of the market (Lee et al., 2000).  This is especially so if a 
market pioneer has not undertaken pre-emption strategies against later market entrants 
(Ghemawat, 1986; Kerin et al., 1992; and Urban et al., 1986).  Once a market is invaded, the 
victor is often the firm that has greater resources, deeper pockets, and possesses a more 
aggressive marketing strategy (Schnaars, 1986; D’aveni, 1995). 
In order to achieve a continued monopolistic dominance of the market, pioneers need to 
pre-empt entry into their markets, even before entries are immediately apparent.  Market pioneers 
need to systematically design, structure, and implement a series of pre-emptive actions to acquire 
competitive advantages against potential market entrants, or better still, to deter potential entrants 
from attempting market entry in the first place.  Successful pre-emption of market entries by 
pioneering firms ensures that their hold of the markets endures and a lasting period of above-
average profits is achieved (Von Hippel, 1984; Ghemawat, 1986; Lilien and Yoon, 1990; Golder 
and Tellis, 1993; Begg et al., 2003).  Many researchers have studied how firms embark on entry 
deterrence strategies to deter or slow other firms from entering its market (Bunch and Smiley, 
1992). This paper aims to provide an understanding of how market pioneers can successfully pre-
empt market entries (i.e. to prevent potential entrants before they enter its market), in terms of the 
types of pre-emption strategies that are applicable under different situations. 
There is vast literature on market pre-emption that prescribe a variety of strategies (e.g. 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998; and Song et al., 1999).  This paper performs an analytic 
review of these various pre-emption strategies to develop an integrative framework of pre-
emption strategies.  Like Porter (1980), our aim for such a framework is to provide a prescriptive 
guide to managers in strategy decision-making.  However, in contrast to Porter’s (1980) 
framework of generic strategies, our framework focuses on pre-emption strategies. Such a 
framework would be useful for managers in sensitising them to the range of alternative pre-
emption strategies possible, and in assisting them in deciding on the type of pre-emption 
strategies that are most suitable for their own situations. 
 
 
Literature Review and Analysis 
The topic of entry pre-emption has been extensively researched in both the economics 
and marketing literature since the pioneering work of Bain (1956).  The goal of pre-emption is to 
deter entry from occurring, and/or to enhance an incumbent’s competitive ability against market 
entrants.  Towards this end, various authors have suggested a variety of pre-emption strategies.  
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These strategies can be broadly classified based on the advantages acquired by the market 
incumbent – cost superiority, consumers’ switching cost, channel exclusivity, credible 
commitments, and environmental barriers of entry -- that allow it to successfully deter future 
entries, and/or defend its position against entries in the event that they occur.  We shall therefore 
review the pre-emption strategies documented in the literature by their bases of competitive 
advantages. 
 
Preemption Based on Cost Superiority 
Various authors have suggested that market incumbents could successfully pre-empt 
against market entrants by acquiring a cost superiority over later entrants into the market (Table 
1).  For example, Rao and Rutenberg (1979) suggested that first movers could achieve cost 
advantages through economies of scale. This is feasible because of their monopolistic hold of the 
market, which allows them to achieve higher sales and production volume, and hence generating 
greater economies of scale.  In addition, first movers could derive cost advantages from the 
economies of scope through brand and product line extensions, ahead of future entries (Thomas, 
1996; Perman and Scouller, 1999; Robinson and Chiang, 2002), and/or through savings in direct 
costs as a result of their marketing mix strategies (Robinson and Fornell, 1985). 
(Put Table 1 here) 
Given that first movers have a head start in the market, Ghemawat (1986) suggested that 
they could also reap cost advantages that result from the learning and experience curve effects.  
These include increased skill levels and expertise of employees, and the accumulation of 
resources, ahead of future entries (Miller et al., 1989; Liebermann and Montgomery, 1988).  
Furthermore, if the skills and expertise acquired could be kept as a secret and/or are firm-specific, 
then the cost advantages gained could be enduring (Spence, 1981; Peterlaf, 1993; Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995).  An incumbent firm who has achieved a cost advantage could then signal its 
cost efficiency to potential market entrants through limit pricing (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982b; and 
Srinivasan, 1991), and excess capacity (Masson and Shaanan, 1986), so as to discourage them 
from attempting entry.  
Pre-emption based on cost superiority, through the various means described, can be a 
powerful strategy that has been used with great success (Porter, 1981).  For example, Porter 
(1981) reported that the reason Proctor and Gamble was able to maintain its dominance in the 
disposable diapers market in the US was because of its cost superiority that was acquired ahead 
of later entrants, through the learning and experience curve effects.  While in the financial 
services industry, Tufano (1989) reported that innovators could charge lower prices and seize 
higher market shares than imitators because of their lower cost position. 
 
Pre-emption Based on Consumers’ Switching Cost 
Several authors have suggested that market pioneers could enhance their competitive 
positions against future entrants by increasing their consumers’ switching cost ahead of future 
entries (Table 2).  Consumers’ switching cost could be firm- or brand-specific and refers to the 
cost faced by existing users if they switch brands, and is therefore an indicator of consumers’ 
reluctance to switch from one brand to another.  Pre-emption strategies that increase consumers’ 
switching cost can be effective in deterring entries because, when consumers’ switching cost for 
a pioneer’s products is high, later entrants into the market will have to utilise a significant amount 
of extra resources to persuade buyers to change brand (Liebermann and Montgomery, 1988; 
Neven, 1989).  This is true even if other barriers to entry are low.  For example, Makadok (1998) 
suggested that in the money market mutual fund industry, where the barriers to entry are low, 
pioneering advantages could still be achieved by increasing customers’ switching costs, which 
therefore restricts accessibility to existing customers by later market entrants. 
(Put Table 2 here) 
There are several ways by which incumbent firms could increase the switching cost of 
their existing customers.  Wernerfelt (1985) suggested that effective pre-emption could be 
achieved by designing products that require users to invest time and effort in learning to use them 
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effectively, and making such skills and knowledge acquired to be brand specific.  Pioneering firms 
could also increase consumers’ switching cost by designing their products in a way that they 
require supplementary products that are brand specific.  For example, by customising batteries 
and chargers so that they are specific to a particular brand of hand-phones, and designing 
software to be specific to a brand of computers (Klemperer, 1987; Kerin et al., 1992), consumers’ 
switching costs would be increased, thereby discouraging them from switching to another brand. 
In addition, Schmalensee (1982) suggested that by being first in the market, pioneering 
firms have the opportunity to establish their products as the standard against which future 
products are judged.  Alpert (1987) suggested that a pioneering advantage could also be 
achieved by enhancing the recall of the pioneer’s brand, such that the brand becomes an 
exemplar that comes to mind more readily than other brands.  This is most effective, the author 
suggested, if the brand becomes generalisable to the entire product class.  Such arguments are 
consistent with the result of Carpenter and Nakamoto’s empirical study (1989), which showed that 
customers’ perceptions can be influenced in a way that a pioneer’s product can be perceived as 
prototypical of the product category. 
Consumers’ switching cost could also be increased through a firm’s investments in 
building a strong brand image and brand loyalty for its products (Neven, 1989, and Wernerfelt, 
1991).  Krouse (1984) argued that the creation and sustenance of a brand and its reputation 
essentially assured customers that the necessary quality level would be provided, an assurance 
that new entrants were denied.  In addition, for many convenience goods and low-to-medium 
involvement products, when brand loyalty is strong, buyers do not spend excessive time to 
search for a superior product.  Instead, they rely on the brand image as a signal of product 
quality.  A strong brand image therefore causes consumers to be reluctant to try new and little-
known brands.  This is especially true for services because of their intangibility, and consumers’ 
perceptions that quality uncertainty and risk of purchase are greater for services than for physical 
products (Mitchell and Greatorex, 1990; and Murray and Schachter, 1990).   
For experience-type goods (Nelson, 1970, and 1974) which generally carry a higher risk 
of purchase compared to search-type goods, Conrad (1983) showed that consumers are 
prepared to pay a price premium for pioneering brands, as they are more knowledgeable of these 
brands than of later brands.   This suggests that a market pioneer, by investing in promotions to 
inform and educate consumers about its brand, could increase consumers’ switching costs for its 
brand (Conrad, 1983; and Schmalensee, 1982), and block consumers from trying out later brands 
that come into the market (Hoch and Deighton, 1989).  Late entrants attempting to persuade 
consumers to switch brands would therefore encounter resistance, as the idea of switching and 
having to get used to a new brand becomes unappealing (Schmalensee, 1982). 
Pioneering firms could also increase consumers’ switching cost by imposing penalties on 
consumers switching to other brands.  For example, a firm could impose transaction costs on a 
customer by charging him for services rendered in closing a bank account (Klemperer, 1987).  
Alternatively, firms could also increase consumers’ switching cost by providing incentives for the 
repeated use and purchase of their products.  For example, credit card companies are known to 
reward their clients with “usage points” that depend on card spending.  These points could be 
used to exchange for gifts, to purchase other products at reduced prices, or to reduce the card’s 
annual subscription rate.  Similar customer retention strategies have been implemented by some 
airlines in the form of “frequent flier” programmes to encourage repeat purchases (Klemperer, 
1986).  As existing customers might lose the accumulated incentives by switching to other 
brands, customer retention programmes can therefore be effective in preventing them from trying 
other brands that enter the market later.  
Apart from the strategies above, network effects on the order of entry are also discussed 
in recent years. The term ‘network effects’ refer to how the value of a product depends on how 
many users use it. The values of a product will increase as more users use or own the product 
(Katz and Shapiro 1985). For example, the value of Microsoft Windows will be enhanced when 
more people use it as a platform. Lee and O’Connor (2003) pointed out that network effects might 
occur in certain industries (e.g. information technology) and switching costs might positively 
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depend more on network size. Therefore, once a product is widely used by customers and the 
value of the product increases with the number of users, this raises switching costs and thus 
deters consumers from adopting other products. Although network effects might increase the 
switching costs of customers, Lee and O’Connor (2003) further indicated that market pioneers 
might lose their advantages if new entrants are able to build networks quickly. Yet, if a market 
pioneer can establish a strong network base, market entry might become difficult due to 
customers’ reluctance to adopt new products. Some other researchers also address the 
advantages of network effects. For example, Shankar and Bayus (2003) conducted an empirical 
research of the home video game industry to show that network strength (the marginal impact of 
increasing in network size on demand) will positively affect customers’ demand and the 
effectiveness of a firm’s pricing and advertising. By improving network strength, network effects 
could be enhanced and therefore allow customers to enjoy more benefits from the same 
products, thus further increasing switching costs.  
 
Pre-emption Based on Channel Exclusivity 
Market pioneers are well placed to gain an advantage based on exclusivity in supplies 
and distribution, as they have the first claim to scarce resources and market access factors.  
Liebermann and Montgomery (1988) suggested that by controlling access to critical supplies and 
to channels of distribution, thus causing potential entrants to be largely handicapped if they still 
choose to enter the market, entry could be averted.  Superior access to suppliers and preferred 
access to markets not only restricts channel access by later entrants (Ghemawat, 1986); they 
also increase the cost of entry to potential market entrants (Neven, 1989). 
(Put Table 3 here) 
Several ways to achieve channel exclusivity have been suggested by various authors 
(Table 3).  A market pioneer could gain control of access to supply and distribution channels 
through exclusivity contracts that provide incentives to channel members in exchange for their 
commitment to an exclusive exchange relationship in terms of supply or brand representation 
(Porter, 1974).  Resources permitting, a market pioneer could also achieve channel control 
through vertical and/or horizontal integration (Ghemawat, 1986; Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988). 
From the literature on transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981), it could also be 
inferred that, by investing in brand-specific assets ahead of future entries, a first mover could 
achieve channel control.  Assets like technical skills, product and market knowledge, and 
customer relationships, if specific to a market pioneer or its brand, have little or no salvage value 
for channel members in exchange relationships with firms other than the market pioneer 
(Williamson, 1981).  The build-up of such assets by a market pioneer thus makes channel 
members less willing to switch allegiance to later entrants into the market.  This therefore results 
in channel members being locked into the exchange relationship (Stump and Heide, 1996; 
Williamson, 1979) with the pioneering firm, which accords the latter a distribution advantage. 
Yet another way of achieving a distribution advantage is by covering every available 
‘space’ or market opportunity ahead of future entries (Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Schmalensee, 
1978).  This requires that a market pioneer follows a product proliferation strategy (Neven, 1989) 
in which it pre-emptively fills in all profitable market segments and niches that later entrants may 
be attracted to, offering each of these segments a differentiated product (Schmalensee, 1982, 
and Robinson and Fornell, 1985).  In addition, such a strategy allows a pioneering firm to exploit 
its brand equity and to benefit from cost reductions that result from the economies of scope 
(Thomas, 1996; Robinson and Chiang, 2002). 
The literature on spatial competition (e.g. Schmalensee, 1978; Lane, 1980; and Urban et 
al., 1986; Brito, 2003) also suggested that market pioneers can pre-empt entry by being the first 
to occupy preferred locations.  This is especially important at the retail level where strategic retail 
locations are scarce.  In addition, a product extension strategy of introducing multiple products 
and product lines maximises occupation of retailers’ shelf-space (White, 1983) and thus restricts 
access by later entrants.  Extending this argument, Robinson and Fornell (1985) suggested that 
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pioneering firms follow an intensive distribution strategy to dominate shelf-space in order to pre-
empt later entries.  Other than maximising occupation of retail shelf-space, a broad product line 
also requires channel intermediaries to commit greater time and resources to its marketing, and 
hence reduces their ability to devote significant commitments to new brands introduced by later 
market entrants. 
 
Pre-emption Based on Environmental Barriers of Entry 
Potential entrants into a market could be denied access if there are substantial barriers to 
entry that are due to environmental factors.  The presence of such entry barriers requires that 
“additional resources must expended by a non-pioneering firm, beyond those required under 
conditions of simultaneous entry, to compete effectively in the market place relative to the first 
mover” (Kerin et al., 1992, p34).  To the extent that the resource requirements for entry are 
sufficiently high, entry is effectively denied. 
(Put Table 4 here) 
In the literature, various authors (Table 4) have examined the impact of environmental 
factors as entry barriers.  For example, Ghemawat (1986) suggested that market pioneers could 
deter entry by being on the right side of governmental policies.  Governmental policies can be 
effective barriers to entry, by imposing stringent conditions and constraints, which later market 
entrants find impossible to comply with.  As such, businesses that are on the correct side of 
public policy could influence governmental regulations to their advantage (Ghemawat, 1986). 
Continued investments in research and technological improvements to the product and/or 
processes could also serve as entry barriers to potential market entrants.   Continued productive 
R&D could serve as a credible signal of an incumbent’s ability to overtake any rivals considering 
a similar research programme (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982; Karakaya, 2002; Begg et al., 2003), 
and results in perceived technological superiority (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988).  Entry 
deterrence could also be achieved when technological improvements resulting from proprietary 
R&D efforts undertaken can be patented or kept as a trade secret (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982).  
In the drug industry for example, Gorecki (1986) found that prescription drugs enjoyed 
tremendous pioneering advantages, in part due to patent protections.  Neven (1989) also 
proposed that pioneering firms deter entries by denying access by later entrants to technology 
through patent protection, without which competitive advantages based on technology are not 
sustainable.  This is because the diffusion of technology occurs swiftly in many industries as a 
result of ‘reverse engineering’, workforce mobility, research publications, and informal technical 
communications (Liebermann and Montgomery, 1988). 
Extending the argument for the use of patents to deter entries, Bresnahan (1985) 
suggested that not only the technology directly relevant to the product or process could be 
patented; alternative technologies should also be patented so that potential entrants are 
effectively blocked from entry.  The author cited the case of Xerox, which patented a host of 
alternative technologies in addition to those crucial to its basic Xerography process.  So 
successful was Xerox in preventing entries into the industry, that challengers have resorted to 
anti-trust actions to force it to license its technology (Bresnahan, 1985; Hill, 2005). 
In markets where market information is not readily available or can only be acquired at 
high costs, the lack of market information itself could be a barrier to entry (McGahan, 1993).  The 
lack of market information translates into greater uncertainty and business risks for new entrants, 
putting them at a disadvantage compared to incumbent firms.  For this reason, McGahan (1993) 
suggested that demand information could be kept proprietary by an incumbent in order to deter 
entry.  The author’s argument can be extended to include any information that pertains to market 
access and attractiveness – like suppliers, intermediaries, market contacts, demand, etc., which 
pioneering firms should keep private. 
 
Pre-emption Based on Credible Commitment to React Aggressively 
In general, market entry decisions are made based on an evaluation of the attractiveness 
of the market targeted for entry.  Hence, potential entrants might be discouraged from entry, if an 
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incumbent could credibly convey to them that the market being targeted would be made 
unattractive if indeed they entered it.  A market pioneer could achieve this by credibly committing 
to defend its market position, and signaling its intent to react aggressively to any market 
intrusions made by later entrants. Kreps and Wilson (1982) have showed that if an incumbent has 
a strong reputation for being adversary over time (e.g. adopting predatory pricing to deter later 
entrants), its aggressive reputation can serve as a threat to impede other entries. Aggressive 
reactions by an incumbent firm to reduce the attractiveness of the market targeted include 
increasing the cost and risk of entry.  Hence, threats to carry out such reactions, if credible, can 
influence the entry decisions of later entrants (Spence, 1979; Hultink and Langerak 2002). 
(Put Table 5 here) 
In the economics literature on entry deterrence, various authors have identified several 
ways to achieve credible commitment to react aggressively to entry (Table 5).  Credible 
commitments are those that obligate an incumbent firm to aggressively defend its market position 
against any entry attempts being made, even if short-term losses are incurred.  Dixit (1979) 
suggested that a first mover’s investments in excess capacity serve as a credible threat of 
lowered prices and post-entry profitability.  Dixit (1980) further argued that irrevocable 
commitment of investment alters the initial conditions of the post-entry game to the advantage of 
the incumbent, thus achieving entry deterrence. 
Consistent with Dixit’s arguments, Eaton and Lipsey (1979) showed that capacity 
expansion, just at the point in time when entry is profitable, deters entry and is profit maximising 
for an incumbent firm.  Ghemawat’s (1984) study provided empirical support for Eaton and 
Lipsey’s suggestion that capacity expansion by incumbent firms deters entry.  In a further study, 
Eaton and Lipsey (1980) also suggested that irreversible investments serve as credible exit 
barriers that commit an incumbent to defend its market, which therefore deter entries.  In support 
of this argument, an empirical study by Ghemawat (1986) showed that market pioneers could 
credibly signal their commitment to defend their market against potential entrants through durable 
investments. 
Other than through irrevocable investments in fixed assets, Selten (1978) suggested that 
a first mover could credibly signal its commitment to defend its market by acquiring a “reputation 
for toughness”.  This refers to a firm’s reputation for taking aggressive reactions against 
attempted entries into its market.  Similarly, Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) suggested that entry 
can be deterred if a firm exhibits some behavioural rule, like being a “fanatical predator”.  A 
reputation for aggressive retaliation against entry could be achieved through a history of 
aggressive behaviours against competitors – like engaging in price wars, predatory pricing, and 
major marketing campaigns.  Such a reputation could be effective in entry deterrence as it 
increases the cost and risk of entry into a market supplied by an aggressive incumbent firm, to 
the extent that potential entrants are convinced that entry is just not worth trying. However, the 
reputation of being aggressive might not be useful in every situation. Clark and Montgomery 
(1998) claimed that reputation is less useful when entrants have greater knowledge of incumbent 
firms. Their study showed that the relationship between entrants’ behaviour and reputation is not 
as clear as thought previously. 
Apart from establishing a strong reputation to deter new entries, some researchers 
propose that incumbents who signal their intentions to preempt may be able to frustrate potential 
rivals. For example, Heil and Robertson (1991) indicated that incumbent firms’ ability to develop 
barriers to new entries and the credibility of such pre-emptive signals will determine the likelihood 
of achieving pre-emptive advantage. Clearly, factors such as signalling commitment, signalling 
reputation, signal consistency, signal clarity, signal aggressiveness, and the attributes of signal 
receivers will also affect how signal receivers interpret them (Heil and Robertson, 1991).  
 
A Framework of Pre-emption Strategies 
Market pioneers enjoy a unique opportunity not available to all later entrants, which is the 
opportunity to pre-empt the arrival of other competitors.  From the literature review and analysis, 
several bases of advantages are identified, upon which successful pre-emption of entry could be 
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achieved.  We propose that the various pre-emption strategies reviewed can be categorised 
along two dimensions – strategic advantage and strategic focus.  We define strategic advantages 
as those advantages possessed by an incumbent firm that allow it to effectively deter and/or 
sustain its position against future entries.  Such advantages can further be classified into two 
types – exclusivity and cost superiority, which we define as follows: 
 
(i) Exclusivity: A strategic advantage that allows market incumbents to restrict 
market access to later entrants. 
  
(ii) Cost Superiority: A strategic advantage based on a low-cost position acquired 
by market incumbents. 
 
Our proposed dimension of strategic advantage is not unlike that proposed by Porter 
(1980), who suggested that cost superiority and “uniqueness as perceived by customers” were 
important in competing for markets.  However, we propose that a firm’s unique or exclusive 
position can be achieved in several ways, other than through customers’ perceptions alone.  As 
our analysis of the literature illustrates, an incumbent can acquire a strategic advantage in 
exclusivity by increasing consumers’ switching cost, controlling access to critical supplies and to 
channels of distribution, exploiting market environmental factors to create barriers to entry, and 
making credible commitments to react aggressively to entry.  Uniqueness of consumers’ 
perceptions is but one way to increasing consumers’ switching costs. 
Our analysis of the literature also suggests that a market pioneer’s strategic advantages 
in exclusivity depend on the focus of its pre-emptive actions.  By focusing on the consumer, 
channel, itself internally, and/or market environment, an incumbent can achieve strategic 
advantages in switching cost, distribution, credible commitment, and/or environmental barriers to 
entry, respectively, to preempt entry.  Hence, in contrast to Porter’s (1980) framework of generic 
strategies in which one of the key dimensions is strategic target, we propose that another key 
dimension of our framework of pre-emption strategies is strategic focus.  An incumbent’s strategic 
focus can thus be viewed as the key area(s) – consumers, channel, internal, and/or environment -
- on which it can concentrate to acquire a strategic advantage(s) to pre-empt entry. 
Based on the two dimensions of strategic advantage and strategic focus, we therefore 
present a four by two (4 x 2) framework of pre-emption strategies, from which five generic- type 
pre-emption strategies for incumbent firms (Figure 1) can be identified.  These strategies are: (i) 
the cost leadership strategy, (ii) the switching cost strategy, (iii) the tie-up strategy, (iv) the 
credible commitment strategy, and (v) the blockade strategy. 
(Put Figure 1 here) 
 
(1) Cost Leadership Strategy: A strategy that focuses on consumers and channel 
members, offering them more attractive pricing terms than that could be offered by later 
market entrants. 
 
A cost leadership strategy as a pre-emption strategy requires that a market incumbent 
focuses on its consumers and channel members, offering them more attractive pricing terms than 
could be offered by later market entrants.  This is feasible if an incumbent possesses a cost 
superiority over later entrants into the market.  An analysis of the literature suggests that an 
incumbent could achieve cost superiority in several ways.  For example, it could be achieved 
through economies of scale and scope (Rao and Rutenberg, 1979; Thomas, 1996; Robinson and 
Chiang, 2002), and learning and experience curve effects (Spence, 1981; and Ghemawat, 1986).  
Cost superiority could also be achieved through the acquisition of appropriate skills and expertise 
(Miller et al., 1989; and Liebermann and Montgomery, 1988), production technology upgrades 
and product designs (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982), distribution efficiencies (Robinson and Fornell, 
1985), and appropriate sourcing strategies (Ghemawat, 1986; and Liebermann and Montgomery, 
1988). 
 
 
Lee, Khai S. and Irene C L Ng, (2007), “An Integrative Framework of Pre-Emption Strategies,” Journal of 
Strategic Marketing, Forthcoming 
 
8 
 
(2) Switching Cost Strategy: A strategy that focuses on consumers to build up their cost 
of switching to brands/products offered by later market entrants. 
 
In following a switching cost strategy, a pioneering firm focuses on its consumers to build 
up their cost of switching to brands, products, and/or services, offered by later market entrants.  A 
high switching cost makes consumers reluctant to change brands, unless they are compensated 
for the cost of switching.  This places a price pressure on later market entrants, who have to 
significantly reduce their prices in order to induce consumers to switch to and try their brands.  A 
high switching cost could be achieved by investing in brand equity and loyalty (Neven, 1989; 
Schmalensee, 1982; Hoch and Deighton, 1989; and Wernerfelt, 1985, and 1991), increasing 
brand rememberability (Alpert, 1987), increasing consumers’ knowledge and confidence of 
product quality (Conrad, 1983; and Krouse, 1984), and framing consumers’ perceptions 
(Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1989).  Consumers’ switching cost could also be increased by 
increasing their product-specific investments (Conrad, 1983; and Wernerfelt, 1985; and 
Liebermann and Montgomery, 1988), providing incentives for repeat use and purchase 
(Klemperer, 1986), and designing products such that they require supplementary products that 
are captive. Consumers’ switching costs can be also increased through bundling products or 
increasing the potential of losing benefits or money (Burnham, Frels, Mahajan, 2003). Finally, 
network effects also enhance consumers’ switching costs when customers can obtain more 
benefits from having more people use the same products (Lee and O’Connor, 2003). 
(3) Tie-Up Strategy: A strategy that focuses on channel members to gain their exclusive 
commitment to a market incumbent. 
 
As with the switching cost strategy, the tie-up strategy aims to prevent channel members 
from changing their allegiance to other brands/firms that enter the market later.  However, in 
contrast to the switching cost strategy, the tie-up strategy focuses on channel members, including 
suppliers and channel intermediaries.  By preventing channel members from committing to 
brands, products, and/or services offered by later market entrants, a tie-up strategy thus restricts 
the market access of entrants to suppliers and channel intermediaries.  Control of access to 
market channels could be achieved through exclusivity contracts (Porter, 1974; and Ghemawat, 
1986), vertical and horizontal integration (Ghemawat, 1986), investments in brand-specific assets 
(Stump and Heide, 1996), and tie-up of scarce resources (Liebermann and Montgomery, 1988).  
It could also be achieved through spatial pre-emption of attractive market segments, retail 
locations (Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Schmalensee, 1978; Lane, 1980; and Thomas, 1996) and 
retailers’ shelf-space (White, 1983; and Robinson and Fornell, 1985). 
(4) Credible Commitment Strategy: A strategy to influence entry decisions by 
conveying a credible threat of aggressive reactions to entries. 
 
While the pre-emption strategies described earlier focus on consumers and channel 
members, a credible commitment strategy requires a market incumbent to credibly commit itself 
to undertake aggressive reactions, should entries be attempted, and to convey such a threat to 
potential entrants in advance, in order to deter entry attempts.   
A market incumbent’s threat of aggressive reactions to entries is credible if it possesses a 
“reputation for toughness” (Selten, 1978), or is known to be a “fanatical predator” (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1982a).  Such a reputation could be acquired through past aggressive behaviours in 
competition.  A firm’s threat of aggressive reactions is also credible, if it possesses a cost 
superiority (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982b), as this increases its chances of success against 
attempted entries.  In addition, strategic investments in irrevocable assets, or pre-emptive 
investments, would commit an incumbent firm to react aggressively against entries (Spence, 
1977 and 1979; Dixit, 1980; Masson and Shaanan, 1986; Reynolds, 1987; and Neven, 1989).  
This is credible because, by incurring such investments, a market incumbent would suffer an 
even greater reduction in profitability if it chooses to accommodate entries (by not reacting 
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aggressively), than if it chooses to react aggressively to entries.  In this regard, investments in 
excess capacity (Dixit, 1979), capacity expansion just prior to entry by competitors (Eaton and 
Lipsey, 1979), and creation of exit barriers (Eaton and Lipsey, 1980), serve as signals of a market 
incumbent’s readiness to aggressively defend its market.   
(5) Blockade Strategy: A strategy that focuses on the market environmental factors to 
capitalise on and/or influence them in such a way as to gain strategic advantages. 
 
In contrast to all the above pre-emption strategies, a pioneering firm following a blockade 
strategy focuses on the market environmental factors, with the aim of capitalising on and/or 
influencing them in such a way as to gain strategic advantages over later entrants.  Towards this 
end, a pioneering firm could patent its core technology (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; and Neven, 
1989) as well as alternative ones (Bresnahan, 1985).  Market incumbents could also lobby for 
governmental policies that restrict market access to later entrants and/or confer benefits to 
market pioneers (Ghemawat, 1986).  In addition, by keeping private important demand 
information (McGahan, 1993), the risk of entry faced by later entrants would be increased due the 
greater uncertainties they face when market information is lacking. 
(Put Figure 2 here) 
Figure 2 provides a summary of the various pre-emption strategies described, in terms of 
their objectives, foci, and the means by which they could be achieved. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Of the five pre-emption strategies identified above, which of these strategies (or a 
combination of) a market incumbent should follow depends on a number of factors.  First of all, 
the pre-emption strategy intended should be permissible.  In some countries, anti-trust acts will 
prevent the use of some of the pre-emption strategies suggested.  Another consideration is the 
long-term payoffs associated with the use of a particular pre-emption strategy.  Obviously, a 
market incumbent firm should select the pre-emption strategy that maximises its payoffs over the 
long term.  On the other hand, the pre-emption strategy that is potentially the most profitable may 
be costly to implement.  Hence, a firm’s available resources need to be taken into account also 
(Robinson et al., 1992; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998).  A firm’s core competencies will also 
affect its choice of pre-emption strategy, as one based on a firm’s existing core competencies is 
more readily implemented with lower cost.  A pre-emption strategy that is consistent with an 
industry’s key success factor(s) will be more effective, and hence this also needs to be taken into 
consideration. 
In deterring entries from occurring in the first place, it is important that potential entrants 
read a market incumbent’s signals of commitment correctly.  Otherwise, once market entry has 
occurred (mistakenly or otherwise), the “sunk” investments made by the entrant may pose as a 
formidable exit barrier.  This commits the entrant to carving out a position, even though it may be 
disadvantaged compared to the incumbent firm.  Under such a situation, an aggressive response 
by an incumbent will potentially result in a prolonged and intense competition that is costly to both 
the incumbent and the new entrant.  Hence, it is important that an incumbent ensures that 
potential entrants do not misread its intended intensity of aggressive response.  For this purpose, 
pre-announcements become necessary, to convince potential entrants to defer their entries 
(Eliashberg and Robertson, 1988). Network effect is another issue that incumbent firms need to 
take into account. Launching a product with strong network effects will affect customers’ switching 
cost directly, and a strong network will become a significant barrier to new entrants as well.  
 To pre-empt entries, firms have to be pro-active.  By undertaking pre-emption strategies, 
much resources and effort may be saved if entries can be successfully deterred.  Although the 
literature contains numerous and diverse prescriptions as to how pioneering firms can pre-empt 
entries, little has been done to synthesise the literature into a coherent structure that is useful in 
providing managerial guidance and directions.  Hence, by presenting an integrative framework 
based on an analytic review of the existing literature, our paper aims to provide a prescriptive 
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guide for managers in formulating pre-emption strategies to protect their markets. In addition, our 
paper provides problems of application in terms of the five pre-emption strategies (Table 6). 
(Put Table 6 here) 
            Based on our literature review and the discussion above, we further submit that 
incumbent firms should take into account three factors before they practice the five pre-emption 
strategies. The three factors are: Internal factors, external factors, and cognitive factors. Internal 
factors refer to the long-term payoffs of incumbent firms, the complexity of organisational 
structure, the core competition of incumbent firms, managerial problems of practicing pre-emption 
strategies, the ability of practicing pre-emption strategies, sunk cost, and network effects of 
products. External factors refer to issues such as anti-trust law, public opinion, governmental 
policies, the need of customers, the development of technology, free rider problem, and the 
competitive level of market. Finally, cognitive factors relate to the new entrants’ expectations of 
incumbent firms’ signalling.  
 Karakaya and Stahl (1989) have found that five barriers (cost advantages of incumbents, 
product differentiation of incumbents, customer switching costs, access to distribution channels, 
and government policy) could make a difference in pre-empting entry into consumer and 
industrial goods markets. Yet the specific application timing of the five strategies varies in 
different situations. There seem to be no single criterion for comparing which strategy is better 
than the other in a dynamic market. Hence, before incumbent firms embark on any of the five pre-
emption strategies, we suggest that these three factors be considered to guide their use. 
The framework proposed and the pre-emption strategies identified also assist managerial 
decision-making by sensitising managers to the range of alternative pre-emption strategies that 
may potentially be suitable to their situations.  In addition, the proposed framework provides 
managers with directions as to the area(s) to focus (the strategic focus), and the bases for 
successful pre-emption (the strategic advantage), in devising effective pre-emption strategies.  
Finally, the framework serves as a benchmark for managers to assess the adequacy of their 
existing pre-emptive efforts, and to identify alternatives that complement their existing efforts. 
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Table 1: Review of Literature on Pre-emption Based on Cost Superiority 
 
Study Bases of Pre-emption 
Rao and Rutenberg, 
1979 
Theoretical Study 
Pioneering firms gain a cost advantage over entrant due to economies of 
scale. 
Spence, 1981 
Theoretical Study 
Pioneers can create entry barriers and deter entry through costs 
advantages created by the learning curve. 
Milgrom and Roberts, 
1982b 
Theoretical Study 
Limit pricing is a signal of an incumbent’s cost efficiency, and hence deters 
entry. 
Robinson and Fornell, 
1985 
Empirical Study 
Pioneers obtain cost advantages through savings in direct costs, as a result 
of its marketing mix strategies. 
Masson and Shaanan, 
1986 
Empirical Study 
Incumbents can deter entry by signalling their cost advantage through both 
limit pricing and excess capacity. 
Ghemawat, 1986 
Empirical Study 
Pioneers gain a cost advantage over entrants due to economies of scale 
and scope, which result from experience effects. 
Liebermann and 
Montgomery, 1988 
Conceptual Study 
Pioneers are able to acquire a cost advantage through their proficiencies 
and the learning curve effect. 
Miller, Gartner, and 
Wilson, 1989 
Empirical Study 
Late movers are not able to achieve the cost positions of pioneers, although 
the late movers may have to follow lower price positions. 
Tufano, 1989 
Empirical Study 
Pioneers are able to capture higher market shares because they have lower 
costs, and hence can charge lower prices. 
Srinivasan, 1991 
Theoretical Study 
 
A low-cost pioneer operating in multiple markets can signal its low cost 
advantage by undertaking limit pricing in all the markets served.  The 
pioneer can achieve further cost reductions by combining the costs of 
signalling across the markets. 
Thomas, 1996 
Empirical Study 
Large investments in advertising to build up brand names lower a firm’s 
cost in introducing new products, which provides an incentive to a pioneer 
to introduce new products before the onset of an increase in demand. 
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Table 2: Review of Literature on Pre-emption Based on Consumers’ Switching Cost 
 
Study Bases of Pre-emption 
Schmalensee, 1982 
Theoretical Study 
Pioneering brands become the standard against which future entrants are 
judged, making it difficult for later entrants to persuade customers to invest 
in learning about their qualities.  Hence, barriers to entry are increased for 
high-risk and low-purchase frequency products, experience and 
convenience goods, and with increased brand awareness. 
Conrad, 1983 
Theoretical Study 
When product quality is uncertain, risk-averse consumers are willing to pay 
higher for a pioneering brand than for a later brand, because they are more 
informed about the pioneer’s quality. 
Krouse, 1984 
Conceptual Study 
 
The creation and sustenance of brand image and reputation assures 
customers that the necessary quality level will be provided.  This is an 
assurance that new entrants are denied. 
Wernerfelt, 1985 
Theoretical Study 
Consumers’ experience with a brand creates user skills that increase 
switching costs. 
Alpert, 1987 
Conceptual Study 
A pioneering advantage can be achieved by increasing brand 
rememberability, such that it becomes an exemplar that comes to mind 
more readily than other bands.  This is most effective when the brand 
becomes generalisable to the entire product class. 
Klemperer, 1986 
Theoretical Study 
Consumer switching costs may be increased through the learning required 
in the use of a brand, transaction costs imposed by a firm for switching, 
consumer investments in specific equipment, and/or psychological costs 
incurred in switching as a result of repeat purchase or habit.  
Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988 
Conceptual Study 
Pioneers can pre-empt entrants by increasing buyers’ switching cost 
through branding.  Entry may be deterred if late entrants have to utilise 
extra resources to persuade buyers to switch brands. 
 
Carpenter and 
Nakamoto, 1989 
Empirical Study 
Pioneers can frame the perceptions of the category that its product falls 
under, such that it becomes prototypical of the category.  
Hoch and Deighton, 
1989 
Conceptual Study 
Pioneering firms can block consumers from indulging in trials of other 
entrants by matching promotional tactics, reinforcing the brand, and 
explaining to customers the brand satisfaction derived. 
Neven, 1989 
Conceptual Study 
Brand loyalty increases customers’ switching costs, and hence is effective 
in deterring entry. 
Wernerfelt, 1991 
Theoretical Study 
Brand loyalty increases customers’ switching cost, and thus allows an 
incumbent to command a larger market share. 
Lee and O’Connor, 
2003 
Conceptual Study 
Network effects might occur in certain industries (e.g. information 
technology) and switching costs might positively depend more on network 
size.  
Shankar and Bayus, 
2003 
Empirical Study 
Through enhancing network strength, network effects could be enhanced 
and therefore make customers enjoy more benefits from the products. 
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Table 3: Review of Literature on Pre-emption Based on Channel Exclusivity 
 
Study Bases of Pre-emption 
Porter, 1974 
Empirical Study 
For convenience goods, a pioneer can erect barriers to entry by making it 
difficult for potential rivals to gain access to distribution.  
Prescott and Vischer, 
1977 
Theoretical Study 
First movers can pre-empt entry by locating in as many positions (physically 
or spatially) as feasible so that there are no remaining locations that are 
sufficiently profitable for future entrants. 
Schmalensee, 1978 
Theoretical Study 
By pre-emptively filling in attractive market niches that later entrants may be 
attracted to, entry can be deterred. 
 
Lane, 1980 
Theoretical Study 
Firms can prevent entry from occurring by locating themselves in several 
entry-deterring locations. 
Robinson and Fornell, 
1985 
Empirical Study 
 
Pioneers can acquire a distribution advantage, and hence pre-empt entry, 
through intensive distribution and domination of shelf-space. They can also 
have a broad product line that occupies the positions for the largest and 
most lucrative segments, leaving the smaller and less profitable niches to 
later entrants. 
Ghemawat, 1986 
Empirical Study 
 
Entry deterrence can be achieved by placing obstacles in the way of 
potential rivals.  Pioneers should attempt to acquire sustainable advantages 
in having superior access to suppliers and preferred access to markets, and 
restricting the options of competitors. 
Urban et al., 1986 
Empirical Study 
An incumbent can deter entry by taking-up a preferred position, and 
increasing brand advertising. 
Liebermann and 
Montgomery, 1988 
Conceptual Study 
Entry can be averted if rival perceives its inability to access scarce 
resources to be a major obstacle.  Pioneers should therefore pre-empt entry 
through the tie up of scarce resources. 
Neven, 1989 
Conceptual Study 
 
A pioneer can deter entry through increasing a rival’s cost of entry, brand 
proliferation, pre-emptive product location, advertising to build brand image, 
and product design. 
Thomas, 1996 
Empirical Study 
 
Pioneers who possess well-known brands have lower costs of introducing 
new brand extensions.  Pioneers can therefore limit the market share of 
potential entrants by crowding the product spaces. 
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Table 4: Review of Literature on Pre-emption Based on Environmental Barriers to Entry 
 
Study Bases of Pre-emption 
Gilbert and Newbery, 
1982 
Theoretical Study 
 
Firms can pre-empt by investing in research to develop “sleeping patents” 
which are withheld from use, but which will deny potential rivals access to 
the technology.  Continued investments in R&D can therefore serve as a 
credible signal by an incumbent’s ability to overtake any rival considering a 
competitive research programme. 
Bresnahan, 1985 
Empirical Study 
By patenting multiple new and alternative technologies, potential entrants 
can be ‘blocked’ from entry. 
Ghemawat, 1986 
Empirical Study 
Pioneers can deter entry by being on the right side of governmental public 
policies. 
Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988 
Conceptual Study 
Entry can be deterred through a rival’s perceptions of a pioneer’s 
technological superiority. 
Neven, 1989 
Conceptual Study 
A pioneer can deter entry by denying access of potential entrants to 
technology through patents. 
McGahan, 1993 
Theoretical Study 
 
If entrants are kept ill-informed about demand, and hence their perceived 
risk of entry is increased, then they can be deterred from entry.  An 
incumbent should therefore keep demand information private, or even 
manipulate it, to influence entrant’s decision. 
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Table 5: Review of Literature on Pre-emption Based on Credible Commitment 
to React Aggressively 
 
Study Bases of Pre-emption 
Selten, 1978 
Theoretical Study 
By fighting entry from the outset, a firm can develop a reputation that will 
deter later entrants. 
Spence, 1979 
Theoretical Study 
Pioneers can undertake pre-emptive investments to deter entry into the 
market. 
Dixit, 1979 
Theoretical Study 
Excess capacity serves as a credible threat of lowered prices and 
profitability post-entry. 
Eaton and Lipsey, 1979 
Theoretical Study 
Capacity expansion, just at the point in time when it would be profitable for 
entry, is profit-maximising for the incumbent and deters entry. 
 
Dixit, 1980 
Theoretical Study 
Irrevocable commitment of investment alters the initial conditions of the 
post-entry game to the advantage of the incumbent, and deters entry. 
Eaton and Lipsey, 1980 
Theoretical Study 
Irreversible investments serve as a credible exit barrier that commits an 
incumbent to defend its market.  Hence, such exit barriers also become 
barriers to entry. 
Kreps and Wilson, 1982 
Conceptual Study 
If an incumbent has a strong reputation for being adversary over time, and 
then the aggressive reactions can normally serve as threats to impede 
other entries. 
Milgrom and Roberts, 
1982a 
Theoretical Study 
Entry can be deterred if a firm exhibits some behavioural rule, like being a 
“fanatical predator”. 
Ghemawat, 1984 
Empirical Study 
A low-cost firm can pre-empt potential entrants by adding new capacity. 
Ghemawat, 1986 
Empirical Study 
Durable investments signal a pioneer’s commitment to defend its market 
against entry. 
Heil and Robertson, 
1991 
Theoretical Study 
Incumbent firms’ ability to develop barriers to new entries and the credibility 
of signals will determine the likelihood of achieving pre-emptive advantage. 
Clark and Montgomery, 
1998 
Empirical Study 
Reputation is less useful when entrants know more about incumbent firms. 
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Table 6: Pre-emption Strategies: Issues of Application  
 
 Strategy Issues of Application 
Cost 
Leadership 
 Strategy 
 
Cost leadership could arise from economies of scale and learning curve 
effects (Karakaya and Stahl, 1989). It also can be achieved by production 
technology upgrades and distribution efficiencies. However, new entrants 
might able to enter the market through imitation, or even as a free rider 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). The costs of imitation is usually lower 
than the cost of R&D. Incumbent firms may therefore lose their cost 
advantage if they cannot deter imitation. In this case, incumbent firms might 
need to apply for patents to protect their advantage. 
 
If incumbent firms are not able to adapt to environmental change (e.g. 
incumbent firms might become inflexible to the shifts of technology or 
customer needs if they are locked in their fixed assets), potential rivals may 
still enter. Lin and Carley (1997) pointed out that a firm with complex internal 
structures may signal inflexibility. In this case, incumbent firms may need to 
improve their organisational design.  
 
Switching Cost 
Strategy 
 
A high switching cost could enhance incumbent firms’ pioneering advantage. 
Yet, market pioneers with a network advantage might lose their advantage if 
new entrants are able to build networks quickly (Lee and O’Connor, 2003). 
Also, increasing switching cost by designing and establishing products as the 
standard in the market might deter new customers from using the firm’s 
products. Furthermore, service failures might negate a switching cost 
strategy even if an incumbent firm can build a strong brand image and loyalty 
for its products. Finally, customers might not happy with penalties. To deter 
customers from switching, firms should provide a fair price, good service, 
and conduct themselves ethically (Keaveney, 1995). 
 
Tie-Up 
Strategy 
 
Exclusivity contracts could prevent new entries successfully (Aghion and 
Bolton, 1987; Ramseyer, Rasmusen, and Wiley, 1991), and some empirical 
studies also support this view (Yong, 1996; Pedro and Sicotte, 2003). 
However, Posner (1981) argued that some exclusivity contracts may not 
deter new competitors because incumbent firms need to compensate 
customers for relinquishing the chance of meeting new entrants. Moreover, 
if a market is close to perfect competition, exclusivity contracts might not 
result in extra benefits for incumbent firms (Davies, 1986). 
 
Vertical and horizontal integration might enhance the market power of 
incumbent firms through integrating R&D, manufacture and distribution. 
New entrants therefore need to consider the cost and benefit of entries. 
However, incumbent firms may need to pay the costs of vertical and 
horizontal integration, and outside environment (such as anti-trust acts) also 
imposes constraints on such integration. Other strategies such as 
investments in brand-specific assets, tie-up of scarce resources, and spatial 
pre-emption might result in costs increasing as well. Incumbent firms need 
to take internal factors (costs and managerial problems) and outside 
environment into account. 
 
Credible 
Commitment 
Strategy 
Credible commitment strategy refers to conveying a credible threat of 
aggressive reactions to entries. However, the strategy would deter entry 
only when established companies are able to signal their reaction (Yip, 
 
 
Lee, Khai S. and Irene C L Ng, (2007), “An Integrative Framework of Pre-Emption Strategies,” Journal of 
Strategic Marketing, Forthcoming 
 
23 
 1982). Thus, if established companies are small and young, or they are not 
able to build strong barriers, a credible commitment strategy might not be 
useful. Furthermore, reputation is less useful when entrants know more 
about incumbent firms (Clark and Montgomery, 1998)   
 
Blockade 
Strategy 
Pioneering firms might obtain pioneering advantages from patenting their 
products or technology. Yet, technological discontinuities might provide 
chances for new competitors (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). If the 
demand for customers and the development of technology are very 
dynamic, pioneering firms may not be able to keep their pioneering 
advantages through patenting because new entrants might have advanced 
technologies or better abilities to respond to customers’ needs. 
Furthermore, keeping private important demand information might not be so 
successful, because some products are visible (e.g. car). New competitors 
can read demand information from product designs and from other 
information. If new competitors can provide a better price or product design, 
demand may be influenced towards that of the new product. Finally, 
lobbying for governmental policies might cause ethical problems and such a 
strategy may backfire on the incumbent firm.  
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Pre-emption Strategies: Focus, Aim, and Means 
 
Pre-emption 
Strategy 
 
 
Focus 
 
Aim and Means 
Cost 
Leadership 
Strategy 
 
 
Customers: 
• Consumers  
• Channel 
Members 
To achieve cost advantage through: 
• Economies of Scale and Scope 
• Experience Curve 
• Skills and Expertise Acquisition 
• Technology Upgrade 
• Product Design 
• Distribution Efficiency 
• Sourcing Strategy 
 
Switching 
Cost Strategy 
 
 
Consumers To build up consumers’ cost of switching to other 
brands/products, through: 
• Brand Equity, Loyalty, and Rememberability 
• Increasing Consumers’ Brand Specific Confidence 
• Increasing Consumers’ Brand Specific Investments in Skills 
and Knowledge 
• Framing of Consumers’ Perceptions 
• Incentives for Repeat Purchase and Use 
• Product design, which requires supplementary products that 
are captive 
• Network effects 
 
Tie-Up 
Strategy 
 
 
 
Channel: 
• Suppliers  
• Channel 
Inter-
mediaries 
To gain channel members exclusive commitment to brand/firm, 
through: 
• Exclusivity Contracts 
• Horizontal and Vertical Integration 
• Spatial Pre-emption of Market Segments and Retail Shelf-
Space 
• Investments in Brand-Specific Assets 
 
Credible 
Commitment 
Strategy 
 
Internal To influence entry decisions through threats of aggressive 
reactions, made credible through: 
• Acquiring a Reputation for Toughness 
• Signalling of Cost Superiority 
• Pre-emptive Investments in excess capacity, capacity 
expansion, exit barriers, etc. 
 
Blockade 
Strategy 
 
 
 
Environmental 
Factors 
To capitalise on or influence market environmental factors to 
gain strategic advantages, through: 
• Patent for Core Technology and Alternative Technologies 
• Lobbying for favourable Public Policies 
• Proprietary Market Information 
 
 
 
